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Ottoman Arabia and the Holy Hijaz, 1516-1918
William Ochsenwald
Abstract
Governments in Arabia today usually ignore the Ottoman Empire’s history in the region,
but the Ottomans from 1516 to 1918 played a key role in coastal regions, especially in the
Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina. While Ottoman administrations intermittently
ruled in Yemen and eastern Arabia, their influence was greatest in the holy Hijaz, the site
of the worldwide pilgrimage. However, Ottoman rule was limited by Istanbul’s distance
from Arabia. Religion played a significant role in determining the nature of Ottoman
control, helping to legitimize the state among its subjects. A detailed analysis of one
province, the Hijaz, with a particular emphasis on the period from 1840 to 1908, shows the
impact of general factors on political history. Hijazi environmental, social, and gender
history were modestly influenced by the centralizing Ottoman government. The Ottoman
Empire in Arabia succeeded in notably slowing the encroachment of European imperialism
into the heart of Islam.

Introduction
The Ottoman Empire ruled substantial sections of the Arabian Peninsula for about 400
years, beginning with gaining the allegiance of the Hijaz region of western Arabia in 1516
and lasting up to the end of Ottoman rule at the close of World War I in 1918. This means
that the Ottomans influenced Arabian history throughout the early modern period of world
history from around 1500 to around 1800, as well as during part of the modern period of
world history, beginning around 1800. In order to understand the history of the Arabian
Peninsula it is then essential to examine the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and
Arabia, especially in the key region of the Hijaz that contained the two holiest cities for
Muslims—Mecca and Medina.
Yet despite the importance of Ottoman Arabia, the modern states of the peninsula
generally ignore or even actively criticize Ottoman rule in the region. This is in part caused
by the present ruling elites, who in most cases consist of members of dynasties that were
historical enemies of the Ottomans. Others in Arabia today share the opinion of many Arab
nationalists who view the Ottomans as anti-nationalist and who see the empire as an
oppressor of the Arab people. Devout Muslims also recall with disapproval the religious
syncretism that marked the early Ottoman state and the secularism that was gaining ground
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in the Ottoman Empire in its last days (Hathaway, 2008; Masters, 2013; Ochsenwald, 1992;
Ochsenwald, 2011-2012).
Outside the Arabian Peninsula, most Western scholars have also generally ignored the
history of Ottoman Arabia, partially because of the difficulty of research access but also
because as compared to such places as Egypt, Arabia before the era of oil production was
deemed not worthy of attention. It was only the end of Ottoman Arabia during World War
I and in particular the adventures of T. E. Lawrence, “Lawrence of Arabia,” that captured
much attention.

Chronological Overview
In attempting to overcome these problems, an understanding of Ottoman-Arabian history
should build on a brief chronological outline of Ottoman rule in the Arabian Peninsula
(Salibi, 1980). Ottoman control over the Hijaz lasted through most of the period from 1516
to 1918, but Ottoman control over Yemen and the al-Hasa region of eastern Arabia was far
more intermittent. In those two regions of Yemen and eastern Arabia, the Ottoman age can
be divided into two periods of time: the first was from 1516 to the 1630s and the second
was from about 1850 to the end of World War I in 1918.
Ottoman suzerainty came first to the Hijaz. After the Ottoman conquest of Mamlukruled Egypt in 1516, the local leader or sharif of Mecca (a descendant of the Prophet
Muhammad) voluntarily affiliated himself with the Ottoman Empire. From that time until
the Arab Revolt of 1916, with only occasional brief intervals, the Ottomans had a military
presence in Mecca, in its port city of Jidda, and in Medina. The Ottomans also attempted
to provide security for transportation by land and by sea to the Hijaz.
In Yemen, to the south of the Hijaz, Ottoman rule was more tenuous, with two separate
time periods of control. In 1538 the Ottoman admiral Süleyman Pasha formally expanded
what had been up to then an informal presence and supervision to full Ottoman control
over sections of Yemen, particularly the coast and the port city of Aden, but also parts of
the northern highlands that were inhabited principally by Zaydi Shi`is. However, in about
1636 the Zaydis expelled the last Ottoman garrison, gaining independence from the
Ottoman state for over 200 years. It was only in the 1840s that the Ottomans returned,
taking control of the coast. In 1872 the Ottomans regained the interior of Yemen, and
eventually the southern sections, though not including the British-ruled city of Aden or its
hinterland. However, Ottoman power was severely shaken by a Zaydi rebellion before
World War I (Ochsenwald, 1990). Several historians, including Thomas Kuehn, have lately
argued that the Ottomans in nineteenth-century Yemen possessed a sense of cultural
superiority over indigenous Yemenis similar to that of the European imperialists, thereby
limiting the effectiveness of Ottoman rule in that distant province (Kuehn, 2011). In any
event, of the 400 years between 1516 and 1918, Ottoman control in Yemen lasted about
185 years, slightly less than half of that time.
In the eastern part of Arabia bordering the Gulf, Ottoman expansion could take place
only after the conquest of Iraq, a land which was contested with Safavid Shi`i Iran. The
Ottoman ruler Süleyman the Great, known also as Kanuni Süleyman, won control of
Baghdad in 1534; by 1550 most sections of the al-Hasa region in what is today Saudi
Arabia gradually had come to accept Ottoman overlordship. This expansion was in a region
where Portugal was expanding control, having seized coastal areas in Bahrain and in Oman
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as part of a strategy aimed at dominating the commerce of the western Indian Ocean basin.
Many in the population of the al-Hasa region welcomed the Muslim Ottomans, fearing
Catholic Portuguese raiding and expansion. However, in about 1670 the Al Humayd chiefs
of the Banu Khalid tribe overthrew the Ottoman governor and set up their own local
principality. Subsequently, they and other separate and distinct local ruling dynasties in
Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar eventually came to govern most of the coast. However,
these independent states were challenged by the Saudi dynasty in alliance with Wahhabi
Islam. The capital of the Saudi state was in the interior, first at Dir`iyya and then at nearby
Riyadh.
The Saudis controlled the al-Hasa from 1795 to 1818, from 1830 to 1839, and from
1843 to 1871. However, in 1871, Midhat Pasha, the famous Ottoman reformer who was
then the empire’s governor of Baghdad, fearing the growing strength of Britain in the Gulf,
sent 3,000 troops to invade and occupy al-Hasa. The region of al-Hasa thus came firmly
under Ottoman control. In addition, the principality of Qatar eventually accepted a limited
degree of Ottoman overlordship, much along the lines of Ottoman claimed suzerainty over
Kuwait. This situation changed radically in 1913, the year before the outbreak of World
War I, when Saudi forces occupied al-Hasa and expelled the Ottoman garrisons there.
Britain had already severely challenged Ottoman claims in Qatar and Kuwait by extending
a kind of protectorate over them. Thus, Ottoman control or strong influence in eastern
Arabia lasted about 165 years out of the 400 year time period we are examining.
From this chronological discussion it is possible to ascertain that Ottoman influence
in Arabia was more likely to have been influential in the Hijaz than in either Yemen or alHasa. Ottoman control lasted more than twice as long in the holy cities of Mecca and
Medina than in Yemen or in the east.

The Importance of the Coast, Ottoman Distance from Arabia,
and the Role of Religion
Three major themes dominate the history of Ottoman Arabia from 1516 to 1918: the first
theme is the key role played by coastal regions; the second theme is the limitation on the
power and influence of the Ottoman state caused by its distance from the peninsula; and
the third theme is the importance of religion in compelling involvement with Arabia. When
considering the 400-year long relationship between the Ottoman Empire and Arabia it is
important to recognize that the Ottomans were chiefly interested in the eastern and western
coastal regions of the peninsula and in the transportation routes leading to them. To a much
lesser degree the Ottoman government also occasionally had an interest in the southern
coast, including such places as Aden. From the perspective of the 21st century when central
Arabia, the home of the royal house of Al Sa’ud, dominates Saudi Arabia, the largest and
most important country in the peninsula, Ottoman interest in the coastal periphery may
seem odd. However, the Ottomans in this regard followed in the wake of earlier Muslim
empires that had ruled portions of Arabia—such empires as those of the Umayyads, the
Abbasids, and the Mamluks.
The reasons for imperial interest in the coasts were geographic, strategic, and religious
in nature. Geographically, the Arabian Peninsula is about 1 million square miles (2.6
million square kilometers) in extant, but most of the interior was desert, with little
agricultural production, scattered oases, a small population consisting mostly of nomadic
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or semi-nomadic Bedouins, and few natural resources. A conquering empire would have
to spend far more money and lives to gain and maintain control in such a region than could
be taken as loot or as taxes. Before the discovery of oil and natural gas, central Arabia and
most of eastern Arabia were poor—so poor in fact that neither the Ottomans nor preceding
empires had been very interested in ruling them. (On the other hand, some regions of inner
Yemen received enough rainfall to permit substantial agricultural production and to support
a larger population.) However, the coasts of the peninsula had importance to the Ottomans
for economic and strategic reasons: commerce with India through the Persian/Arabian Gulf
and through the Red Sea with Africa and India was highly profitable, even after the
Portuguese rounded southern Africa in the 1490s. Both the Red Sea and the Gulf waterways
allowed the Ottoman navy to expand the empire’s reach toward the vast commerce and
rich agricultural lands of the enormous Indian Ocean basin. Conversely, both the Red Sea
and the Gulf could be used by hostile powers to invade Ottoman territories, thereby
threatening such regions as the valuable province of Egypt or the strategically important
area of Iraq. When the Suez Canal opened in 1869 the Red Sea became an even more
important locale for international commerce and military strategy as steamship technology
dramatically increased the speed and size of commercial and military vessels.
The eastern Arabian coast of about 750 miles (1,200 kilometers) was a zone of
commerce contested by the Ottomans, Iranians, Portuguese, the Dutch, and, particularly in
the 19th century, the British. The western coast of about 1,200 miles (1,900 kilometers)
and particularly the region of Hijaz were also of tremendous importance religiously, since
the two holiest cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina, were located there. The Ottoman sultans
wished to maintain control of the western coast of Arabia so as to confirm their claim to be
the protectors of Islam and the servants of the two holy cities. Supporting the hajj or
pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina was a source of political and religious legitimacy. In the
early centuries of Ottoman rule this claim could be reinforced by protecting and securing
the pilgrimage ships coming to the Hijaz via the Red Sea, and the land caravans, coming
slowly by camel every year from all directions of the Muslim world toward Mecca. In the
19th century the Ottomans had added responsibilities: to protect steamships from the
numerous reefs of the Red Sea, to foster the pilgrimage by building a railroad to ease the
burdens of camel travel, and to provide a greater degree of security against foreign
depredations and influences that might impinge on the sacred territory of the Hijaz
(Ochsenwald, 1980; Ochsenwald, 1984).
The second analytical theme is the limitations placed on the Ottoman state because of
its considerable distance from Arabia. To understand this issue it is useful to review
Ottoman history in general before turning to the Arabian Peninsula in particular. The center
of the Ottoman Empire was in Anatolia from Ottoman beginnings around 1300, though at
its height the Ottoman Empire ruled significant portions of three continents—Europe, Asia,
and Africa. This was thereby one of the largest empires in the history of the world. The
ruling Ottoman dynasty was Sunni Muslim in religion and Ottoman Turkish in language.
With its capital in Istanbul (the former Constantinople) after 1453, the central lands of the
state consisted of the Balkans and Anatolia. They provided the largest numbers of troops
and the greatest amount of tax revenue. The great artisanal production of the cities, the rich
agriculture, and the thriving commerce of the Balkans and Anatolia were supplemented by
the Arab provinces. Ottoman economic prosperity and cultural creativity were at a high
point in the 16th century, but the 17th and 18th centuries saw this situation change
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significantly. The power of the Ottoman sultans decreased while the grand viziers and great
households of central and provincial officials became richer and more influential. As a
result, local autonomy increased. It was during these two centuries that Ottoman power in
Arabia was at its lowest ebb. In the 19th century, the Ottomans faced the growing military,
economic, scientific, and industrial power of various Christian European states, in
particular, Britain, France, and Russia. A series of political and military reforms succeeded
in strengthening the power of the Ottoman central government, but the power of the
imperialist Europeans increased even faster. By 1914 emerging internal nationalisms,
foreign intervention, and disastrous wars had led to the Ottoman loss of almost all the
Balkans, as well as all of Ottoman North Africa, including Libya. A misguided alliance
with the German Empire during World War I sealed the fate of the Ottoman Empire,
leading to its dissolution and the emergence in the 1920s of the Republic of Turkey as well
as several Arab states, most of which were under the control of Britain or France (Finkel,
2005; Ochsenwald & Fisher, 2011).
How was it that the Ottoman Empire had lasted so long and had so often achieved
greatness? While historians have advanced a variety of explanations, the flexibility of
Ottoman provincial administration certainly played a role in the ability of the Empire to
maintain a foothold in distant lands for hundreds of years. Whether in Rumania or
Kurdistan or Algeria, the Ottomans often governed indirectly, only demanding some taxes,
an acknowledgement of the dynasty’s overarching supremacy, and control over external
relations. In other regions, such as Bosnia, northern Syria, and Libya, the Ottomans on
occasion extended their core institutions, eventually leading to a substantial degree of direct
control. However, in the geographic core of the Empire, such as western Anatolia or
Thrace, the Ottoman central government usually insisted upon a much greater degree of
direct administration.
The political impact of the Ottoman Empire on Arabia was limited by the slow speed
of transportation and communications. From Istanbul to Mecca is a distance of about 1,500
miles or 2,400 kilometers, while from Istanbul to Sanaa in Yemen is 2,000 miles or 3,200
kilometers. These distances precluded, or at least made very difficult, direct government.
There were also social, economic, and cultural consequences for the long-term
influence of the Ottoman Empire on Arabia that ensued from this physical distance: for
instance, very few Turkish-speaking Ottomans settled in Arabia. The few who did stay
were soon assimilated into Arab society. Turkish poetry, Turkish tiles, Turkish miniature
painting, and a host of other cultural accomplishments and techniques were not extended
on a large-scale basis into Ottoman Arabia. Ottoman patterns of taxation and compulsory
service in the military had to be greatly changed in Arabia or were not adopted there at all.
An example is the conscription of adult Muslim males that became obligatory in the 19th
century, a system that was not extended at all to Ottoman Arabia. Even when the Hijaz
telegraph and the Hijaz Railway were built in the 1890s and 1900s, Ottoman rule in Arabia
remained precarious and limited in scope.
In fact, one could argue that the great distance that separated the heartland of the
Ottoman state from Arabia made Ottoman rule there a negative factor for the overall health
of the Ottoman state. The gifts and subsidies of money and food to the people of the holy
cities of Mecca and Medina drained the central treasury, while the provinces of Yemen and
al-Hasa on the whole cost more than they produced in taxes.
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Turning now to the third analytical factor, the religious claims to political legitimacy
of the Ottoman dynasty rested in large part after 1516 on Ottoman rule of Mecca and
Medina, and Ottoman encouragement of the annual Muslim pilgrimage to those two cities.
From its inception the Ottoman dynasty had been closely identified with Sunni Islam. The
empire was a champion of jihad or holy war on behalf of the Islamic faith. In concrete
terms the Ottomans dramatically expanded into Europe the Dar al-Islam, the realm where
Islam was the predominant religion. The Ottomans fought against Safavid Shi`i Iran, while
advancing Sunni Islam internally through the judiciary, taxation, decrees governing
clothing, and a host of additional measures. By these means, the Ottomans achieved a
degree of legitimacy in the eyes of their Sunni subjects that had not been readily conferred
upon many earlier Muslim states. In later times, the Ottomans came to be seen as the sole
guarantor of the independence of Islam from the expanding Christian European empires
and the Christian missionary movements they encouraged. In the late 19th century the
Ottoman sultan Abdülhamid II emphasized the claim that his ancestors had made to the
caliphate. This use of the title caliph was part of a pan-Islamic policy whereby the sultan
asserted that he was the rightful leader of all Muslims everywhere (Anscombe, 2014, pp.
113-115).
In Ottoman Arabia religious identity and motivations were often paramount. In the
Hijaz especially, but also in Yemen and in the east, the Ottomans used religion as a means
to justify their rule and to gain the acquiescence if not active support of the local
populations. The Ottoman state portrayed itself as the defender of Sunni Islam against a
host of enemies. In Yemen these enemies of the faith in the first period of Ottoman rule
were the Portuguese and the Zaydi Shi`is. In Yemen in the second era the chief enemies
were the British Christians, who had seized Aden for use as a naval base and coaling station
in 1839; the Italian Christians, who were attempting to seize Ethiopia across the Red Sea;
and, once again, the Zaydis. In Eastern Arabia, in the first period of Ottoman rule, the chief
enemies of the faith were the Safavid Shi`is just across the Gulf in Iran, and the Portuguese.
For the second period of rule in the East, the Wahhabi Saudis of the interior and the British
Christians along the coast were the most active opponents of Ottoman-supported Sunnism
(Anscombe, 1997). In the Ottoman Hijaz, the chief enemies over four centuries included a
host of non-Muslims as well as the Wahhabis. In all three of these areas—Hijaz, Yemen,
and eastern Arabia—local Shi`i Muslims were usually deeply unhappy with the oppression
that they endured as a result of Ottoman policy that favored Sunnis.
The Ottomans attempted to support and expand Sunni institutions in Arabia, including
the Hanafi legal school of religious jurisprudence; education through mosques and, in the
late 19th century, also via a few state-run schools; and waqfs (awqaf or evkaf), Muslim
religiously-sanctioned charitable endowments. However, the ability of the state to foster
such institutions was limited, especially in the remote regions of Ottoman Arabia. It was
chiefly in the Hijaz that the Ottomans succeeded in establishing major new waqfs, for
instance, or in building or refurbishing major religious shrines.

Politics in the Ottoman Hijaz, 1840-1908
A detailed analysis of one particular part of Ottoman Arabia for a more limited period of
time will illustrate many of the general points made earlier; this will also permit a brief
outline of the political, social, and gender history of one section of Ottoman Arabia. The
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Ottoman Hijaz entered into a different era in 1840 with the restoration of Ottoman control
after the withdrawal of Egyptian troops, while in 1908 the appointment by the Ottoman
central government of Sharif Husayn ibn Ali as amir of Mecca marked an important turning
point in its history, resulting ultimately in the Arab Revolt of 1916 against Ottoman rule.
Ottoman rule in the Hijaz between 1840 and 1908 waxed and waned, but there were
three constants: Ottoman interest was centered on the coast and the two Holy Cities of
Mecca and Medina, not in the interior of the Hijaz; Ottoman influence in the Hijaz was
limited by the distance separating Istanbul from Mecca, and the resulting slowness of
transportation and communication; and religion was the chief motivating factor in Ottoman
policy. Another constant was the tension between the sharifs who served as amirs of Mecca
and the Ottoman valis or governors of the Hijaz. While both the sharif and the vali were
appointed by the Ottoman sultan, the sharifs had an independent basis of legitimacy as
descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. (This same legitimacy extends today to the rulers
of Jordan and Morocco.) Valis could depend on local Ottoman garrisons and could use
most of the customs duties collected at the port of Jidda, but sharifs had more influence
over the nomadic tribes, merchants, and religious officials than did the valis. However,
both sharifs and valis enjoyed little power beyond the coastal regions, the chief cities, and
the pilgrimage routes leading to Mecca and Medina.
Between 1840 and 1854 the Ottomans restored to the Hijaz the political regime that
had existed before the Wahhabi and then the Egyptian occupations. Initially, finances were
strengthened and the pilgrimage to Mecca took place in peace, with prosperity thereby
ensuing for its merchants and guides. However, a Bedouin uprising around Medina helped
bring about the replacement of the incumbent sharif by Abd al-Muttalib ibn Ghalib in 1851.
Clashes between the new sharif and the vali exacerbated a widespread resistance to new
anti-slavery decrees coming from Istanbul. Skirmishes, battles, and riots led to the
replacement of Abd al-Muttalib by Amir Muhammad in 1855-1856. In 1858, 21 foreign
Christian merchants and diplomats in Jidda were killed by an anti-foreigner and pro-slavery
mob that was supported by a number of local notables. The British shelled Jidda, and
ultimately the Ottoman authorities executed some of the ringleaders, including the market
inspector of the town of Jidda. This incident demonstrated the futility of armed attack
against Christian mercantile interests on the coast, while it also helped increase the power
of the Ottoman state in the Hijaz.
After the upheavals of 1856 and 1858, the Hijaz from 1859 to 1882 enjoyed a period
of relative peace and tranquility. One cause of this was that the numerous political and civil
reforms in Istanbul called the Tanzimat were not, for the most part, applied in the Hijaz.
Security was also maintained by Hijaz-based Ottoman troops even though they usually
only numbered around 6,000 during these years. They were supplemented by police based
in the cities, as well as the troops controlled by the Sharif of Mecca. The troops and police,
as well as the whole settled population, were the beneficiaries of the opening of the Suez
Canal in 1869. The Canal considerably increased the speed of transportation and
communication between Istanbul, Egypt, and the Hijaz, fostering more rapid movement of
troops and commerce. As the central government went bankrupt in the mid-1870s, the
power of the vali decreased, and the power of the Sharif grew. Almost as bad, from the
point of view of the central authorities, was the failure of centralizing reforms in provincial
administration that were imposed in places like Syria, but failed in the Hijaz. Istanbul
annually provided subsidies to the Hijaz administration; this was in addition to gifts and
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pensions to the people of the two holy cities. Special projects, such as the renovation of the
water supply to Mecca in the 1880s, cost extra money.
The years between 1883 and 1908 saw substantially increased political turmoil in the
Ottoman Hijaz. Epidemic diseases threatened the pilgrimage, while Sultan Abdülhamid II
sought to gain more direct control over the region. Vali Osman Pasha assumed more and
more power at the expense of the sharifs; for instance, in 1884, he became the head of the
Meccan Haram, thereby assuming day-to-day control of the administration of the Kaba.
Nevertheless, the Amir Awn al-Rafiq skillfully used palace intrigue in Istanbul and secured
the removal of Vali Osman Pasha in 1886. In the late 1880s and early 1890s Awn al-Rafiq
accumulated large sums of cash from the pilgrims and the merchants, but the return of
cholera compelled him to support disinfection methods that were extremely unpopular.
Awn al-Rafiq worked out a means of cooperating with valis until his death in 1905. This
arrangement was disturbed when the central government built first a Hijaz telegraph line
in the 1890s, and then announced the plan to construct a railway linking Ottoman Syria
and Palestine to the Hijaz. In the 1900s the Sharif encouraged nomads to the north of
Medina to challenge the construction of the Hijaz Railway from Damascus south to
Medina. Local resistance was eventually overcome, and the Hijaz Railway reached Medina
in 1908. This railroad line was termed by the Ottoman sultan holy because the supposed
chief purpose in its operations was to foster the pilgrimage, but in addition to that laudable
aim, the Hijaz Railway could be used to move troops as well as pilgrims south toward the
Hijaz. A planned extension of the line from Medina to Mecca was stopped by the new Amir
Husayn and by the multiple challenges the Ottoman government faced between 1908 and
1914 (Ochsenwald, 1984).

Environmental, Economic, Social, and Gender History in the Hijaz
The environment of the Hijaz was harsh and forbidding: a bleak desert, bleaker mountains,
and resulting widespread poverty outside the cities. Both the interior and the coast
experienced scorching heat and there was little rainfall. For instance, in Jidda on average
there were only nine days of rain annually. Inland, commerce and the movement of
pilgrims were made difficult by the terrain and aridity. The city of Medina was particularly
isolated from the rest of the Hijaz because of its geographic environment, while the port of
Jidda was much more open to foreign merchants and contacts.
The demographic history of the Hijaz is difficult to ascertain because no official census
was ever conducted there by the Ottoman government. A rough estimate of the urban
population would indicate Jidda at between 20,000 and 30,000 persons; Mecca between
40,000 and 80,000; and Medina at 18,000 to 40,000. Including smaller towns, the urban
population numbered around 85,000 in the period 1840-1870, and around 160,000 by 1908.
There were also roughly 50,000 villagers. It is difficult to estimate the number of nomads
who lived in the Hijaz, but there were perhaps about 400,000. This means that by 1900
there were somewhere between 400,000 and 800,000 people living in the Hijaz, an area of
roughly 450,000 square kilometers. In addition, there were thousands of foreign pilgrims
who flocked to the Hijaz at certain seasons of the lunar religious year.
If one can speak of an environment of time, that is, the way people calculated time and
arranged the seasons of their activities, it is important to note the extraordinary significance
of the Muslim religious calendar based on a lunar cycle. When the pilgrimage season drew
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close, all Hijazis oriented themselves toward the pilgrimage as the single most crucial event
of the year.
The economy of the Hijaz differed from that in most parts of the Middle East, since
the bulk of the settled population lived by occupations other than farming. In the towns,
there was a wide variety of different jobs, often controlled by guilds, with the most
important being pilgrim guides and pilgrim brokers. There were few artisans while an
absence of natural resources such as coal impeded industry. Market inspectors (muhtasibs)
helped set standards and checked on fraud. Poverty was widespread, with outright
destitution prevalent among pilgrims who could not afford to return to their home
countries. On the other hand, there were few barriers to social mobility.
The nature of urban life might be seen in a brief description of Mecca. The city had no
walls around it; it was traversed by unpaved, irregular streets lined with multi-floored
dwellings. There was no fire department, streets were unlit at night, and much of the land
was owned by waqfs. The center of town was the Haram featuring the Kaba. Mecca also
boasted two hospitals, two military barracks, 40 water fountains, about 6,500 houses, 95
coffeehouses, and over 3,000 shops. Neighborhoods were divided along ethnic and
economic lines.
Social organizations and status rankings in the cities included guilds, neighborhoods,
and relationships between slaves and their owners. Many townspeople belonged to
guilds—these were producers’ groups organized according to skill or craft. Guilds
controlled admission to trades, supervised the type and quality of goods produced, and
regulated competition. Most guilds provided services to the pilgrims or made goods to sell
to pilgrims. Some examples of guilds were the boatmen in Jidda, muezzins, camel-hirers,
jewelers, bakers, barbers, butchers, masons, porters, and hawkers of goods. The leaders of
each guild approved major sales, supervised prices, and arbitrated arguments and disputes.
Neighborhoods were named after the chief landmark of the area, but neighborhoods were
not fixed in size or boundary, so they could change. Mecca had about 20 such
neighborhoods—in some cases they were based on occupation, so that, for instance, the
potters lived in one neighborhood. Settled Bedouins lived in a separate neighborhood.
Residents originally from Iran lived in still another neighborhood. There was some
differentiation by wealth and status; those regions closest to the Haram in central Mecca
were considered the most desirable neighborhoods. Poor people lived in areas where
disliked occupations also clustered, so that, for instance, undertakers lived in one
neighborhood. People identified themselves with their neighborhood, while male youths
from different neighborhoods were rivals and sometimes even fought each other. An
extreme example of this took place in 1881 when two neighborhoods fought for three days,
resulting in 15 dead and 50 wounded. Slaves were ranked at the bottom of the social
hierarchy prevalent in the cities of the Hijaz. Many slaves were purchased by pilgrims as
investments. Those slaves who remained in the Hijaz usually worked in homes, though
some slaves were used for manual, artisanal, and agricultural labor. While the slave trade
gradually decreased thanks to pressure from the British and some slaves were manumitted
throughout this period, slavery itself remained an important institution in the Hijaz for
townspeople, villagers, and nomads. During Ottoman rule, slavery was sanctioned and
approved by the Muslim ulema as being in accordance with Islam.
The status of many social groups was related to religious criteria. The sharifs of Mecca
and their households tended to be at the top of status ranking because of their prestige as
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descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. Descendants of other prominent families also
enjoyed high esteem, including charitable gifts from the Ottoman sultan. On the other hand,
Shi`is and in particular the numerous permanent Shi`i residents of Medina were often
considered by Sunni Muslims to be inferiors. Resident foreign Sunnis generally formed
separate social groups according to their places of origin. Chief among these in Mecca were
the Indians, Javanese, South Arabians, and Turks. Social status was also linked to the
extended family, which was by far the most important group in Hijazi society. Claimed
patrilineal descent was the defining element in determining membership in a tribe.
Unfortunately, the history of women in the Ottoman Hijaz has not yet been sufficiently
researched to allow many conclusive statements. Still, some tentative insights are possible.
For instance, it is clear that the family was the crucial element in urban, village, and
Bedouin social life. This meant that most women married while they were young; there
were very few women who never married in their lives. A widow either remarried fairly
soon after the death of her husband or moved back in with her birth family. Resident foreign
males would frequently return to their home countries to find brides who would then come
to the Hijaz to live.
Societal values were highly patriarchal. Probably women were more restricted in their
freedom of movement than men, had little role in public political questions, and were
legally subservient to husbands. However, there seem to be a number of exceptions to such
broad generalizations. One example was Nafisa bint Abd Allah Khalifa, the spirited wife
of Ibrahim Awliya, who refused to join her husband in Bombay, where he was then living,
and instead sued him for support payments in a Medina judge’s court in 1883. Still, there
was a general separation of women and men outside the home, and women in the presence
of males outside the immediate family circle usually wore veils and concealing robes. In
towns middle- and upper-class women were secluded in their homes, though poorer urban
women, most village women, and many Bedouin women mixed with men more freely and
were less conservative in their clothing. Both men and women placed a great value on
privacy, as could be seen in the design of urban homes. Marriage contracts and the shari`a,
the holy law of Islam, accorded women numerous rights and guarantees, but the shari`a as
enforced in the Hijazi court system seems to have given men more rights and a larger role
in making family decisions. Among the nomads and probably among the villagers
customary law often replaced the shari`a. Unfortunately, the shari`a court records for the
Hijaz have not been examined for information on the status and actions of women. In other
Ottoman provinces a wealth of data has been found in recent years in court records to
illuminate the history of Ottoman women; hopefully, such data for the Hijaz exists and will
be utilized in the future.
Moving from legal to illegal, or from behavior deemed proper to behavior deemed
improper, there is also only limited information available. Sexual behavior may have
differed considerably from the rather theoretical injunctions of the Ottoman judge or the
amir of Mecca. Pilgrims were not supposed to have sexual relations during the crucial days
of their pilgrimage, but before and after that time sex was permitted. Most pilgrims were
males who traveled to the Hijaz without their wives. Behavior deemed scandalous was
especially prevalent in the port city of Jidda. We know that in Jidda in the 1850s alcohol
(forbidden to Muslims by shari`a) was openly available; Jidda in 1884 contained brothels.
But most of the gender history of the 19th century Ottoman Hijaz, including non-normative
behavior, is yet to be written.
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Conclusion
General conclusions include firstly that the Ottomans were chiefly interested in the coastal
regions of Arabia and not the desert interior, except insofar as it encompassed trade or
travel routes to the coasts. However, changes in transportation and communications started
to alter this pattern that the Ottomans had shared with earlier empires. For instance, by the
late 19th century, steamships had reduced the travel time from Suez to Jidda from as much
as 30 days to only three days. The Hijaz Railway linked parts of the northern Hijaz closely
to Syria in the 1900s. By 1914 the Ottomans were planning a railway extension from
Medina to Mecca, and a separate railway in mountainous Yemen.
Later in the 20th century, automobiles, airplanes, and eventually cell phones not only
revolutionized travel and communications in what became Saudi Arabia, they became
ubiquitous. Saudi Arabia is dominated by the Al Sa`ud dynasty based in Riyadh, in the
interior of the peninsula. The values of Wahhabism, long nurtured in central Arabia, are
enforced throughout the kingdom, though they are often in conflict with the more open and
tolerant customs and the diverse populations found along the coasts. So, in this regard, the
nature of the Ottoman approach to Arabia for its 400-year interaction has been reversed.
Secondly, Ottoman Arabia was poor. Even the agricultural production of Yemen was
relatively modest, while al-Hasa in the east, despite its oases, was notably poor. The
pilgrimage to the holy Hijaz gave its cities some wealth, but the outbreak of cholera or
political upheavals among the sharifs could make even that income precarious.
In the 2010s, Yemen is still relatively poor, exporting workers abroad, especially to
Saudi Arabia, and suffering from several civil insurrections and foreign interventions.
However, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, including both the Eastern Province and the Hijaz,
is extraordinarily rich as a result of oil and natural gas production. While much of the oil
revenues wind up in the hands and pockets of a small elite, a great deal also trickles down
to most Saudi subjects, though not much accrues to foreign workers. Ottoman Arabia had
been subsidized by the central government of the Ottoman state and by Egypt. In the 21st
century the users of oil and natural gas in the energy-importing regions of the world, such
as Europe and China, provide Arabia with great wealth.
Thirdly, the impact of Ottoman rule on Arabia was fairly limited in most respects. This
was due in part to the intermittent duration of the Ottoman presence in Yemen and eastern
Arabia. Another important factor that limited Ottoman influence was the failure to extend
and maintain Ottoman institutions throughout the regions in Arabia the empire nominally
controlled. Ottoman administration was often heavy-handed and occasionally even brutal,
but it was also usually quite limited in scope. Most people living in Ottoman Arabia were
not much affected by Ottoman rule, whether considering social institutions, agriculture,
commerce, language, law, or even religion. In this sense it is useful to compare Ottoman
Arabia to other outer provinces of the Empire, such as Libya or Basra.
Fourthly, Ottoman rule over coastal Arabia was crucial in preserving existing societies
from foreign attacks that might well have dramatically changed many aspects of life. For
instance, in the 16th century the Ottomans protected the Hijaz from Christian Portuguese
expansionism and al-Hasa from Shi`i Persian rule. In the 20th century and subsequently,
first Britain and more recently the United States have played a similar role in protecting
the existing status quo in Saudi Arabia from foreign invasion and revolution, whether
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sponsored by Nasser’s Egypt, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, or Khomeini’s Islamic Republic of
Iran. However, the religious and cultural differences between Britain and the United States
as compared to the populations of the Arabian Peninsula today are in contrast to the
religious and cultural similarities that existed earlier between the Ottomans and many of
the inhabitants of Arabia.
Lastly, in the pre-nationalistic era of Ottoman rule in Arabia protecting the pilgrimage
to Mecca and the symbolic prestige of ruling the two holy cities in the Hijaz ensured
Ottoman interest in the Hijaz, though military, commercial, and imperialistic factors also
influenced Ottoman policy. Ruling the Hijaz was a political benefit to the Ottoman royal
family because it gave them religious status among their Muslim subjects and even among
the Muslim population living outside the borders of the Empire.
A similar benefit redounds in the 2010s to the royal family of Saudi Arabia. One
distinct difference though is that the Ottomans ruled the Hijaz in conjunction with the
sharifs of Mecca, while Saudis expelled the ruling Sharifs of Mecca in the 1920s and have
administered the Hijaz directly ever since. Ottoman rule in the Hijaz had been tenuous in
part because of the dual nature of authority and administration; Saudi rule in the Hijaz has
been much more secure, at least as long as the extraordinary wealth of the Kingdom
endures. Today, it is the Eastern Province, with its population of Shi`is and physical
closeness to Iran, that presents a graver regional challenge to Saudi rule and hegemony.
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